Pruitthealth - Evans, LLC
561 University Drive, Evans, GA 30809 · For profit - Limited Liability company · 149 certified beds · (706) 863-7514 Medicare & Medicaid certified
This home has serious findings on its record. Read them closely before you consider it.
- a strong health-inspection score (4/5) — the hardest rating to game (though it’s ranked within its own state, not nationally)
- no federal fines or payment denials on record
- lower-than-typical staff turnover (31% vs 45% nationally) — better care continuity
- fewer deficiencies at its most recent standard inspection than at the one before — a sign of improvement
- it has abuse, neglect, or exploitation citations (F0600, F0608, F0609, F0610) — most recent Aug 2022
- inspectors cited 5 immediate-jeopardy problems — the most serious level
- its payroll-based staffing rating is low (2/5)
One thing this read cannot see: what residents and families actually experience day to day. Public data misses the feel of a place — visit unannounced, ideally at a mealtime or on a weekend, talk to staff and families, and ask your tour questions.
A plain-English summary of the public record below — not a rating, ranking, or recommendation. We take no money from any facility.
| Health inspectionSurveyor-assigned, ranked within your stateInspector-verified | 4 of 5 |
| StaffingFrom payroll records (PBJ) | 2 of 5 |
| Quality measuresSelf-reported by the facility | 4 of 5 |
Location & what’s nearby
Open in Google Maps ↗ · Directions ↗ · Larger map ↗
Nearest of each type, straight-line distance. Hospitals come from the CMS Hospital General Information registry; everything else from Overture Maps (public data). Hospital and park hours are typical — call ahead to confirm.
Quality measures — how residents actually fare
| Overall quality measures | 4 of 5 |
| Long-stay residentspeople who live here | 4 of 5 |
| Short-stay residentsrehab / post-hospital | 4 of 5 |
Quality-measure stars summarize outcomes CMS tracks from the assessments each home submits — avoidable hospitalizations and ER visits, falls with injury, pressure ulcers, unplanned weight loss, and long-term antipsychotic use. Because the underlying data is self-reported, weigh a high score against the independent inspection record. Long-stay = permanent residents; short-stay = rehab and post-hospital stays.
Trend — is this home getting better or worse?
Over 2025-02 to 2026-06, this home’s CMS overall rating improved from 1 to 4 stars. From monthly CMS archive snapshots.
Horizontal axis runs 2025-02 to 2026-06. That is where CMS’s monthly archive ends, so the right-hand edge of each line is that month — not today.
See all quality measures vs. state & national benchmarks
| Measure | This home | State avg | Typical state | vs typical state |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Long-stay residents whose need for help with daily activities increased | 5.8% | 15.3% | 15.4% | better |
| Long-stay residents who lose too much weight | 3.1% | 5.6% | 5.4% | better |
| Long-stay residents with a catheter left in their bladder | 0.3% | 0.9% | 0.9% | better |
| Long-stay residents with a urinary tract infection | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.0% | worse |
| Long-stay residents with depressive symptoms | 0.0% | 11.3% | 6.5% | check this* — see note marked star below the table |
| Long-stay residents who were physically restrained | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.1% | better |
| Long-stay residents with falls causing major injury | 2.5% | 3.2% | 3.3% | better |
| Long-stay residents whose ability to walk worsened | 2.9% | 15.2% | 16.1% | better |
| Long-stay residents on antianxiety or hypnotic medication | 8.4% | 20.5% | 18.9% | better |
| Long-stay residents given the seasonal flu vaccine | 100.0% | 95.0% | 95.3% | typical |
| Long-stay residents with pressure ulcers | 6.4% | 5.6% | 4.7% | worse |
| Long-stay residents with worsening bladder/bowel control | 6.4% | 15.8% | 21.2% | better |
| Long-stay residents who got an antipsychotic medication§ — see the note below the table | 14.2% | 19.9% | 17.1% | better |
| Short-stay residents who newly got an antipsychotic medication | 2.8% | 2.6% | 1.4% | worse |
| Short-stay residents given the seasonal flu vaccine | 98.1% | 78.4% | 79.4% | better |
| Short-stay residents rehospitalized after admission | 11.0% | 25.0% | 22.6% | better |
| Short-stay residents with an outpatient ER visit | 3.3% | 11.6% | 12.0% | better |
| Long-stay hospitalizations per 1,000 resident days | 2.30 | 2.15 | 1.67 | worse |
| Long-stay outpatient ER visits per 1,000 resident days | 0.88 | 1.90 | 1.80 | better |
* This home reported 0% on a measure where lower is better. That can mean genuinely excellent care — but because the number is self-reported, a zero can also mean the problem was not recorded. Weigh it against the inspection record above.
§ Antipsychotics carry an FDA boxed warning — they raise the risk of death in older people with dementia-related psychosis, and are not approved for that use. So this measure is partly a read on whether a home sedates residents instead of staffing for them. But read a low rate carefully in both directions: CMS excludes residents coded with schizophrenia (and Tourette's or Huntington's) from this measure, and federal auditors have found implausible increases in schizophrenia coding since the measure was published — so a very low rate can reflect recoding rather than less prescribing. Ask the home what share of its residents carry a schizophrenia diagnosis, and how it handles behavioral symptoms without medication.
CMS quality measures, as Care Compare shows them. For most rows lower is better (fewer falls, ulcers, hospitalizations); vaccination rates are the exception. Not every row is risk-adjusted. CMS adjusts some measures for resident mix, but falls with major injury, antipsychotic use, physical restraints and the vaccination rates are unadjusted rates — so a home caring for heavier or more behaviorally complex residents can look worse on them without providing worse care. The “typical state” column is the median of the 50 state averages — not a national average of all homes. We use it because a plain average across homes is pulled badly off course by a few states’ reporting habits (long-stay depressive symptoms is the clearest case: Illinois codes it several times higher than most states, which alone lifted the all-homes figure to about twice what a typical state records). The median of state averages resists that — but it does weigh every state equally, so a large state counts no more than a small one, and it is a benchmark of our construction rather than a CMS-published figure. better/worse means the home differs from that benchmark by more than 10% of it; closer than that reads typical. CMS does not publish how many residents each measure covers, and the counts are often small — a single resident can move a rate by several points — so treat small gaps as noise. These come from data the facility reports, so weigh them against the independent inspection record above.
Short-stay rehab — if you are coming here from a hospital
Arriving from a hospital right now? Read the discharge guide → — your appeal rights, how to slow a rushed discharge, and what to ask about the numbers below.
45.0% of the Medicare patients who left this home got back to the community and stayed there for at least 31 days — which CMS reads as no different from the national rate. This is CMS’s risk-adjusted rate over 98 Medicare stays in Oct 2022–Sep 2024, and CMS’s own comparison — not ours.
Met the expected recovery: 22.6% of this home’s Medicare short-stay residents left it at or above the ability to care for themselves and move around that CMS predicted for them, across 31 stays in Oct 2024–Sep 2025. The median of the 11,061 homes CMS publishes this for is 56.6%. Read it beside the getting-home figure, not instead of it: unlike the two measures above, CMS makes no better-or-worse call on this one and publishes no confidence interval for it, so this is a comparison and not a verdict — but it is the short-stay measure that separates homes most, and the one to ask about.
Therapy staffing: this home’s payroll records show 0.21 therapist hours per resident per day in 2026Q1 — more than 24% of the 13,892 homes that report any therapy hours at all.
Weekend therapy: weekend therapy hours are 5% of this home’s weekday level — it runs therapy on weekdays, with essentially none at the weekend. The median home that reports therapy runs 13% — weekday-focused therapy is the industry norm, not a shortfall. But recovery does not pause on a Saturday: ask what the weekend actually looks like here.
This section is about rehab stays, not living here. Most of this page — the stars, the quality measures, the inspection record — describes the home the way a permanent resident experiences it. These figures describe the short Medicare stay after a hospital discharge: a hip, a stroke, a bad infection, six weeks and home. They are different residents, different staff, often a different wing. Therapy hours are per resident in the building, not per rehab patient — the count includes every long-stay resident, and they mostly get no therapy at all. So a home with a small rehab wing inside a large nursing population reads low here even if its rehab patients get plenty of therapy, and a mostly-rehab home reads high. Use it to compare homes doing similar work, ask what a rehab resident actually gets in a day, and remember that CMS does not publish therapy minutes per patient — nobody does.
See every short-stay measure CMS publishes for this home
| Measure | This home | U.S. median | Period covered | CMS’s call |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Got home and stayed homeRate of successful return to home or community from a SNF | 45.0%CMS range 36.3–53.9 | 51.5% | Oct 2022–Sep 2024 | no different from U.S. |
| Went back to hospitalRate of potentially preventable hospital readmissions 30 days after discharge from a SNF | 11.5%CMS range 9.0–14.7 | 10.7% | Oct 2022–Sep 2024 | no different from U.S. |
| Met the expected recoveryPercentage of residents who are at or above an expected ability to care for themselves and move around at discharge | 22.6% | 56.6% | Oct 2024–Sep 2025 | CMS makes no comparison for this measure |
| Self-care at dischargePercentage of residents who are at or above an expected ability to care for themselves at discharge | 32.3% | 52.8% | Oct 2024–Sep 2025 | CMS makes no comparison for this measure |
| Moving around at dischargePercentage of residents who are at or above an expected ability to move around at discharge | 29.0% | 50.0% | Oct 2024–Sep 2025 | CMS makes no comparison for this measure |
| Medication problems followed upPercentage of residents whose medications were reviewed and who received follow-up care when medication issues were identified | 98.2% | 98.7% | Oct 2024–Sep 2025 | CMS makes no comparison for this measure |
| Medication list to the next providerPercentage of residents where the SNF provided a current medication list to the next health care setting | 97.1% | 100.0% | Oct 2024–Sep 2025 | CMS makes no comparison for this measure |
| Medication list to the familyPercentage of residents where the SNF provided a current medication list to the resident, family, and/or caregiver at final discharge | not reported — The number of residents or resident stays is too small to report. Call the facility to discuss this quality measure. | — | ||
| Falls with major injuryPercentage of SNF residents who experience one or more falls with major injury during their SNF stay | 1.8% | 0.0% | Oct 2024–Sep 2025 | CMS makes no comparison for this measure |
| New or worsened pressure ulcersPercentage of residents with pressure ulcers/pressure injuries that are new or worsened | 7.1% | 1.9% | Oct 2024–Sep 2025 | CMS makes no comparison for this measure |
| Infections that led to hospitalPercentage of infections residents got during their SNF stay that resulted in hospitalization | 7.2%CMS range 4.4–11.1 | 7.1% | Oct 2023–Sep 2024 | no different from U.S. |
| Medicare spending per stayMedicare Spending Per Beneficiary (MSPB) for residents in SNFs | 1.01 | 1.02 | Oct 2022–Sep 2024 | CMS makes no comparison for this measure |
From the CMS Skilled Nursing Facility Quality Reporting Program — Medicare short-stay outcomes, which is a different dataset from the long-stay quality measures above and describes a different set of residents. Where CMS risk-adjusts a measure we show its adjusted rate, and the CMS range beside it is the confidence interval CMS publishes: a home whose range is wide is a home with few stays, where one patient moves the number several points. Read the period column. These measures do not share a window — the claims-based ones (getting home, readmission, spending) lag by a year or more, because a stay has to finish and its claims settle before it can be counted. CMS’s call is CMS’s, not ours: it is the only place anyone tests whether this home differs from the national rate at all, and most homes on most measures do not. Two caveats on it. CMS tests only three of these measures — getting home, readmission, and infections that led to hospital; on the other nine it publishes a rate and no comparison, and rather than compute a verdict CMS declined to make, we say so in the column. And on readmission almost every home in the country lands on “no different”, so that row separates homes far less than getting-home does — which is why met the expected recovery, a measure CMS does not test but which spreads across the whole range, is called out above the table rather than left in this list. The U.S. median column is our own, taken across every home CMS publishes that measure for in this same file; it is not a CMS-published benchmark. Homes CMS gives no rate for are left out of it rather than counted as zero. Medicare spending per stay is a ratio, not a percentage — 1.00 means this home’s Medicare spending for a stay matched the national figure CMS compares it against, and it measures cost to Medicare, not quality of care.
Staffing
How full it usually is: this home is certified for 149 beds and averages 128.8 residents a day — about 86% occupied, or roughly 20 beds typically open. It runs fairly full. This is a CMS average, not live availability — no public source publishes real-time vacancies, and a home can be full the day you call. Confirm with the home, and if you need a Medicaid bed specifically, ask about that separately: a home with open beds may still not have an open Medicaid bed.
Against a benchmark — not a legal minimum. In May 2024 CMS finalized the first federal staffing floor for nursing homes: 3.48 total nurse hours per resident per day, including 0.55 RN hours and 2.45 nurse-aide hours. Its hour requirements never took effect and are no longer on the books. Homes had until 2026 (2027 if rural) to comply, and that deadline never arrived: a federal court vacated the hour requirements in April 2025 (CMS has appealed), Congress then barred enforcement until 2034, and CMS formally repealed them by rule effective February 2026. This home is not required to meet these numbers, and is not violating anything by missing them. We still show the comparison because the figures are CMS’s own published estimate of adequate staffing, which makes them a useful yardstick — but they are our benchmark, not federal law: this home’s total nurse staffing of 3.54 hrs/resident/day is at or above the 3.48-hour benchmark and RN staffing of 0.38 is below the 0.55-hour RN benchmark and nurse-aide staffing of 1.83 is below the 2.45-hour aide benchmark. What federal law does require today is unchanged: “sufficient” nursing staff for residents’ needs and an RN on duty at least 8 consecutive hours a day, 7 days a week (42 CFR 483.35). Those are judged by inspectors on site, not by these averages, so read this comparison alongside the inspection record rather than as a pass/fail.
Weekend coverage: total nurse staffing is 2.80 hrs/resident/day on weekends vs 3.84 on weekdays — 27% thinner on weekends — a notable drop. RN hours go from 0.45 to 0.20 per resident-day. (Payroll-based daily records; the national median home is 15% thinner on weekends.)
This home’s total nursing-staff turnover of 31% is below the national median of 45%.
Payroll-based (PBJ) staffing hours, as reported for Jan–Mar 2026 (CMS PBJ CY2026Q1) — the most recent quarter CMS has published, so they can lag a change of operator or staffing agency. Higher is generally better. Registered-nurse coverage and weekend staffing are the numbers families most often overlook — an RN on site matters most when something goes wrong, and coverage usually thins on weekends. High turnover means residents rarely see the same caregiver twice. One caveat: these are hours as reported, not adjusted for how sick or heavy-care this home’s residents are. CMS separately publishes a case-mix-adjusted view; we show the reported hours. A home caring for higher-acuity residents needs more hours to deliver the same care, so compare these figures against homes doing similar work, and read them next to the inspection record rather than alone.
Inspection trend
Deficiencies are fewer than at the previous inspection — improving. Fewer citations over time suggests a home is fixing problems; a rising count is a warning sign — though two surveys are a short record, and survey teams differ. These counts are from the standard annual health survey only; the full citation list below may also include findings from complaint investigations, so the two won’t always add up.
Inspection deficiencies
State health-inspection citations, most serious first. Each carries an F-code (the federal rule it cites, e.g. F-684 = quality of care) and a letter A–L marking how serious and how widespread the problem was — we translate that grid into the plain tiers shown here. Wording is the official federal description.
Each letter is a CMS scope-severity level; highlighted ones are where this home has citations. A–C = no harm found; D–F = potential for harm; G–I = actual harm; J–L = immediate jeopardy. Within each band the later letter is the more widespread finding (an isolated G is one resident; a widespread I is a pattern), so rightward and downward is worse.
13 citations, most serious first — scroll within the box to see all.
- Immediate jeopardy · K2022-08-21 · tag F0608 — failed to report suspected crimes — patternDevelop and implement policies and procedures to ensure (1) employees report any suspicion of a crime against any resident, according to timelines; (2) post the notice of employee rights; and (3) prohibit and prevent retaliation for reporting.
What the surveyor found here — an excerpt from the official record, may be distressing
NOTE- TERMS IN BRACKETS HAVE BEEN EDITED TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY Based on interview, record review, and facility policy review, it was determined the facility failed to develop policies and procedures to ensure that reasonable suspicion of a crime against any resident was immediately reported to local law enforcement for four of five residents (R) (R#58, R#62, R#86, and R#277) reviewed for abuse. Specifically, the facility failed to ensure sexual assaults perpetrated by R#58 against R#62 and R#86 were reported to the police, and that an allegation of staff-to-resident abuse directed toward R#277 was reported to the police. Subsequently, the abuse continued. On 8/18/22, a determination was made that a situation in which the facility's noncompliance with one or more requirements of participation had caused or had the likelihood to cause, serious injury, harm, impairment, or death to residents. The facility's Administrator and Director of Nursing (DON) were informed of the Immediate Jeopardy (IJ) on 8/18/2022 at 5:18 p.m. The noncompliance related to the Immediate Jeopardy was…
This is the beginning of the surveyor’s statement, cut to keep the page readable — the full 2567 continues past this point and often ends with the findings that matter most, such as whether an immediate jeopardy was removed before the surveyors left. The complete statement of deficiencies is a public record: request it from your state survey agency, or ask the home for its 2567 and plan of correction — it must make them available to residents and families.
- Immediate jeopardy · K2022-08-21 · tag F0609 — failed to report abuse allegations — patternTimely report suspected abuse, neglect, or theft and report the results of the investigation to proper authorities.
What the surveyor found here — an excerpt from the official record, may be distressing
NOTE- TERMS IN BRACKETS HAVE BEEN EDITED TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY Based on interview, record review, and facility policy review, it was determined the facility failed to ensure allegations of abuse were immediately reported to the State Survey Agency (SSA) for four of five residents (R) (R#58, R#62, R#86, and R#5) reviewed for abuse. Specifically, the facility failed to ensure allegations of resident-to-resident sexual abuse and staff-to-resident abuse were reported to the SSA immediately. Subsequently, the abuse continued. On 8/18/22, a determination was made that a situation in which the facility's noncompliance with one or more requirements of participation had caused or had the likelihood to cause, serious injury, harm, impairment, or death to residents. The facility's Administrator and Director of Nursing (DON) were informed of the Immediate Jeopardy (IJ) on 8/18/2022 at 5:18 p.m. The noncompliance related to the Immediate Jeopardy was identified to have existed on 6/20/22. An Acceptable Removal Plan was received on 8/21/22. The removal plan included an evaluation for…
This is the beginning of the surveyor’s statement, cut to keep the page readable — the full 2567 continues past this point and often ends with the findings that matter most, such as whether an immediate jeopardy was removed before the surveyors left. The complete statement of deficiencies is a public record: request it from your state survey agency, or ask the home for its 2567 and plan of correction — it must make them available to residents and families.
- Immediate jeopardy · K2022-08-21 · tag F0610 — failed to investigate and act on abuse reports — patternRespond appropriately to all alleged violations.
What the surveyor found here — an excerpt from the official record, may be distressing
NOTE- TERMS IN BRACKETS HAVE BEEN EDITED TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY Based on observations, interviews, record review, document review, and facility policy review, the facility failed to thoroughly investigate allegations of abuse or exploitation involving four of five residents (R) (R#58, R#62, R#86, and R#5) reviewed for abuse. Specifically, the facility: - Failed to thoroughly investigate an incident of resident-to-resident sexual abuse when R#58 was found in R#62's room with his hand inside the resident's gown on 6/20/22. Other residents were not interviewed as to whether they had been exposed to, or had knowledge of R#58's sexually aggressive behaviors as a part of the facility's investigation. Staff who were not on duty at the time of the 6/20/22 incident were not interviewed as to any knowledge they may have had regarding R#58's sexually aggressive behaviors. R#58 was subsequently found on 8/16/22 in the same room with his pants down, genitals exposed, and one knee in the bed with R#86 (R#62's roommate). - Failed to thoroughly investigate an allegation of possible…
This is the beginning of the surveyor’s statement, cut to keep the page readable — the full 2567 continues past this point and often ends with the findings that matter most, such as whether an immediate jeopardy was removed before the surveyors left. The complete statement of deficiencies is a public record: request it from your state survey agency, or ask the home for its 2567 and plan of correction — it must make them available to residents and families.
- Immediate jeopardy · K2022-08-21 · tag F0835 — failed to run the facility competently — patternAdminister the facility in a manner that enables it to use its resources effectively and efficiently.
What the surveyor found here — an excerpt from the official record, may be distressing
Based on observations, interviews, record reviews, and facility policy review, the facility's administration failed to provide oversight and leadership that ensured: (1) Residents were free from sexual and physical abuse, which affected two of five sampled residents (R) (R#62 and R#86) reviewed for abuse; (2) A thorough investigation of allegations of resident-to-resident sexual abuse and staff-to-resident abuse were completed involving three of five sampled residents (R#58, R#62, and R#5) reviewed for abuse; (3) To report allegations of resident-to-resident sexual abuse and staff-to-resident physical abuse to the local law enforcement for four of five residents (R#58, R#62, R#86, and R#277) reviewed for abuse; and (4) To report allegations of resident-to-resident sexual abuse and staff-to-resident physical abuse to the State Survey Agency (SSA) for four of five residents (R#58, R#62, and R#86, and R#5) reviewed for abuse. On 8/18/22, a determination was made that a situation in which the facility's noncompliance with one or more requirements of participation had caused or had the…
This is the beginning of the surveyor’s statement, cut to keep the page readable — the full 2567 continues past this point and often ends with the findings that matter most, such as whether an immediate jeopardy was removed before the surveyors left. The complete statement of deficiencies is a public record: request it from your state survey agency, or ask the home for its 2567 and plan of correction — it must make them available to residents and families.
- Immediate jeopardy · J2022-08-21 · tag F0600 — failed to protect residents from abuse and neglect — isolatedProtect each resident from all types of abuse such as physical, mental, sexual abuse, physical punishment, and neglect by anybody.
What the surveyor found here — an excerpt from the official record, may be distressing
NOTE- TERMS IN BRACKETS HAVE BEEN EDITED TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY Based on observation, interview, record review, document review, and facility policy review, the facility failed to ensure residents were free from resident-to-resident sexual abuse for two of five sampled residents (R) (R#62 and R#86) reviewed for abuse. R#58 displayed behaviors of wandering into the rooms of residents of the opposite sex. The facility failed to develop and implement interventions to address the resident's behavior, and on 6/20/22, staff found R#58 in R#62's room with his hand inside R#62's gown. The facility failed to consistently supervise/monitor R#58 to prevent further incidents of sexual abuse, and on 8/16/22, staff found R#58 in the room shared by R#62 and R#86, with his pants down, genitals exposed, and one leg on R#86's bed. On 8/18/22, a determination was made that a situation in which the facility's noncompliance with one or more requirements of participation had caused or had the likelihood to cause, serious injury, harm, impairment, or death to residents. The facility's…
This is the beginning of the surveyor’s statement, cut to keep the page readable — the full 2567 continues past this point and often ends with the findings that matter most, such as whether an immediate jeopardy was removed before the surveyors left. The complete statement of deficiencies is a public record: request it from your state survey agency, or ask the home for its 2567 and plan of correction — it must make them available to residents and families.
- Potential for harm · D2025-05-21 · tag F0656 — failed to write and follow a full care plan — isolatedDevelop and implement a complete care plan that meets all the resident's needs, with timetables and actions that can be measured.
What the surveyor found here — an excerpt from the official record, may be distressing
Based on record review, interview, and facility policy review, the facility failed to ensure comprehensive care plan included the use of corrective lenses for one of 32 sampled residents (Resident (R) 52) reviewed for care planning. The failure had the potential to affect the resident's psychosocial needs not being met. Findings include: Review of the facility's policy titled, Comprehensive Care Plans, indicated .develop and implement a comprehensive person-centered care plan for each resident, consistent with resident rights, that includes measurable objectives and timeframes to meet a resident's medical, nursing, and mental and psychosocial needs that are identified in the residents comprehensive assessment. Review of R52's quarterly Minimum Data Set (MDS) with an Assessment Reference Date (ARD) of 05/05/25 and located in the electronic medical record (EMR) under the MDS tab, revealed the resident had a Brief Interview for Mental Status (BIMS) score of 13 out of 15 which indicated the resident was cognitively intact. The MDS revealed the resident had a diagnosis on age related…
This is the beginning of the surveyor’s statement, cut to keep the page readable — the full 2567 continues past this point and often ends with the findings that matter most, such as whether an immediate jeopardy was removed before the surveyors left. The complete statement of deficiencies is a public record: request it from your state survey agency, or ask the home for its 2567 and plan of correction — it must make them available to residents and families.
- Potential for harm · F2024-01-18 · tag F0880 — failed to prevent and control infections — widespreadProvide and implement an infection prevention and control program.
What the surveyor found here — an excerpt from the official record, may be distressing
NOTE- TERMS IN BRACKETS HAVE BEEN EDITED TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY Based on observations, staff interviews, record review, and review of the facility's policies titled Water Management Program for Building Water System and Standard Precautions, the facility failed to maintain an effective infection control program by not providing evidence that legionnaires testing was done to prevent contamination of the facility water system. In addition, the facility failed to ensure one of one room doors (room [ROOM NUMBER]) was securely closed for a COVID-19 (Coronavirus Disease) positive resident and failed to post COVID -19 signage at the front entrance throughout the facility. In addition, the facility failed to follow infection control procedures during treatment for two of 28 sampled Residents (R) (R38 and R98). The facility census was 119. Findings include: 1. Review of the facility's policy titled, Water Management Program for Building Water System dated 3/1/2028 revealed, . to reduce risk associated with legionellae and other opportunistic pathogens that may be present in building…
This is the beginning of the surveyor’s statement, cut to keep the page readable — the full 2567 continues past this point and often ends with the findings that matter most, such as whether an immediate jeopardy was removed before the surveyors left. The complete statement of deficiencies is a public record: request it from your state survey agency, or ask the home for its 2567 and plan of correction — it must make them available to residents and families.
- Potential for harm · E2024-01-18 · tag F0851 — patternElectronically submit to CMS complete and accurate direct care staffing information, based on payroll and other verifiable and auditable data.
What the surveyor found here — the official record, unedited, may be distressing
Based on staff interview, record review, and review of the PBJ (Payroll Based Journal) [NAME] Report for Fourth Quarter (Q4) of fiscal year 2023, the facility failed to accurately report its staffing data to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) related to Registered Nurse (RN) coverage. The facility census was 119 residents. Findings include: Review of the PBJ [NAME] Report for Q4 2023, July 1 through September 30, revealed the facility reported data declaring there was no coverage by an RN for at least eight hours for the following dates: 1. July 1-31 2. August 4-6, 12-13, 18-20, 25-27 3. September 2-3, 10, 15-17, 23-24, 30 Interview on 1/18/2024 at 3:46 pm with the Senior Regional Nurse Consultant (SRNC) stated, her company did not acquire this facility until October 2023, and she could not obtain payroll data for the identified time period. She did, however, obtain the Daily Nursing Hours Report Sheets which documented at least one RN on duty for at least eight hours each day of Q4. She stated staffing data would be reported accurately moving forward.
- Potential for harm · D2024-01-18 · tag F0554 — isolatedAllow residents to self-administer drugs if determined clinically appropriate.
What the surveyor found here — an excerpt from the official record, may be distressing
NOTE- TERMS IN BRACKETS HAVE BEEN EDITED TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY Based on observations, resident and staff interviews, record review, and review of the facility's policy titled Self-Administration of Medications by Patients/Residents, the facility failed to assess and obtain a physician order for one out of 28 sampled Residents (R) (R98) to safely self-administer and store medication at bedside. Findings include: Review of the facility's policy titled, Self-Administration of Medications by Patients/Residents dated 12/2/2022 under the Policy Statement revealed, Each patient/resident who desires to self-administer medication is permitted to do so if the healthcare center's Licensed Nurse and Physician have determined that the practice would be safe for that patient/resident and other patients/residents of the healthcare center. Observation and interview on 1/16/2024 at 1:00 pm revealed the following medication, Major Deep Sea Premium Saline -nasal moisturizing spray 1.5 fl oz (44 ml) on a bedside table located in R98's room. R98 stated the nurse gave her the medication (nasal…
This is the beginning of the surveyor’s statement, cut to keep the page readable — the full 2567 continues past this point and often ends with the findings that matter most, such as whether an immediate jeopardy was removed before the surveyors left. The complete statement of deficiencies is a public record: request it from your state survey agency, or ask the home for its 2567 and plan of correction — it must make them available to residents and families.
- Potential for harm · D2024-01-18 · tag F0583 — failed to protect personal privacy — isolatedKeep residents' personal and medical records private and confidential.
What the surveyor found here — an excerpt from the official record, may be distressing
NOTE- TERMS IN BRACKETS HAVE BEEN EDITED TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY Based on observations, staff interviews, record review, and review of the facility's policy titled, Patient/Resident Rights, Accommodations of Needs, the facility failed to ensure visual privacy during treatment for two of 28 sampled Residents (R) (R38 and R98). Findings included: Review of policy titled, Patient/Resident Rights, Accommodations of Needs, Privacy dated 12/1/2023 revealed, Patient/residents will be provided full visual privacy during routine care and treatments by means of privacy curtains and closed doors. 1. Review of R38's clinical records revealed she had diagnoses that included but not limited to, Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus without complications, hypertension, atherosclerotic heart disease, and morbid obesity due to excess calories. Review of R38's physician orders included but not limited to, Lantus Solostar U (unit)-100 Insulin (insulin glargine)100 unit/mL (milliliter) give 3 mL sq (subcutaneous) at hs (bedtime), Hemoglobin A1C every sixth month, Check and record blood sugar q.i.d. (four…
This is the beginning of the surveyor’s statement, cut to keep the page readable — the full 2567 continues past this point and often ends with the findings that matter most, such as whether an immediate jeopardy was removed before the surveyors left. The complete statement of deficiencies is a public record: request it from your state survey agency, or ask the home for its 2567 and plan of correction — it must make them available to residents and families.
- Potential for harm · D2024-01-18 · tag F0584 — failed to keep a safe, clean, comfortable home — isolatedHonor the resident's right to a safe, clean, comfortable and homelike environment, including but not limited to receiving treatment and supports for daily living safely.
What the surveyor found here — an excerpt from the official record, may be distressing
NOTE- TERMS IN BRACKETS HAVE BEEN EDITED TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY Based on the observations and staff interviews, the facility failed to ensure that it was maintained in a safe, clean, comfortable environment for three out of 21 rooms (Rooms 132, room [ROOM NUMBER], and room [ROOM NUMBER]). These rooms contained light bulbs out/not working, multiple scuffed walls, and large cracks in the floor. Findings include: Observation on 1/16/2024 at 11:30 am of room [ROOM NUMBER] revealed there was one of two light bulbs out/not working in the room. Observation on 1/16/2024 at 1:43 pm in room [ROOM NUMBER] revealed multiple scuffed walls, a large crack in the floor and one of two light bulbs out/not working in the bathroom. Observation on 1/16/2024 at 1:53 pm in room [ROOM NUMBER] revealed a large crack in the floor and multiple scuffed walls. Interview on 1/18/2024 at 9:50 am with the Maintenance Director, confirmed the findings in room [ROOM NUMBER] of the one light bulb that was out/not working: in room [ROOM NUMBER], multiple scuffed walls, a large crack in the floor with one of two…
This is the beginning of the surveyor’s statement, cut to keep the page readable — the full 2567 continues past this point and often ends with the findings that matter most, such as whether an immediate jeopardy was removed before the surveyors left. The complete statement of deficiencies is a public record: request it from your state survey agency, or ask the home for its 2567 and plan of correction — it must make them available to residents and families.
- Potential for harm · D2024-01-18 · tag F0791 — failed to provide routine dental services — isolatedProvide or obtain dental services for each resident.
What the surveyor found here — an excerpt from the official record, may be distressing
NOTE- TERMS IN BRACKETS HAVE BEEN EDITED TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY Based on observations, resident and staff interviews, and record review, the facility failed to assist one of 28 sampled Residents (R) (R38) with necessary arrangements to obtain routine dental services for replacement of her missing dental partial. Findings include: Observation and interview on 1/16/2024 at 12:01 pm, revealed R38 in her room during lunch. R38 reported that her upper dental partial was missing. She opened her mouth to show that the upper dental partial was missing. The lower dental partial was present. She revealed that her dental partial had been missing two months or more. R38 revealed that she removed her dentures every night without assistance. She reported that the upper dental partial was in her bed sheets and had been mistakenly taken to laundry by a laundry aide. R38 revealed that the laundry aide and several facility staff (whom she had informed) refused to assist her with searching for the upper dental partial on that day. R38 was unable to identify staff. Observation on 1/17/2024 at…
This is the beginning of the surveyor’s statement, cut to keep the page readable — the full 2567 continues past this point and often ends with the findings that matter most, such as whether an immediate jeopardy was removed before the surveyors left. The complete statement of deficiencies is a public record: request it from your state survey agency, or ask the home for its 2567 and plan of correction — it must make them available to residents and families.
- Potential for harm · D2022-08-21 · tag F0660 — isolatedPlan the resident's discharge to meet the resident's goals and needs.
What the surveyor found here — an excerpt from the official record, may be distressing
NOTE- TERMS IN BRACKETS HAVE BEEN EDITED TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY Based on clinical record review, interviews, and facility policy review, the facility failed to ensure a safe discharge for one of three residents (R) (R#125) reviewed for discharge. R#125 was discharged from the facility to home on [DATE] without a confirmation that home health services were in place and that there was a capable family member at home to assist with the resident's continued care needs following discharge. Findings included: A review of the facility policy, titled, Discharge Summary and Plan of Care, dated 3/1/19, revealed the following: Policy: It is the policy of this facility to ensure that a discharge planning process is in place which addresses each resident's discharge goals and needs, including caregiver support and referrals to local contact agencies. Policy Explanation and Compliance Guidelines: 1. The discharge planning process will begin at admission and include a discharge plan based on the resident's assessment and goals for care, desire to be discharged , and the resident's capacity…
This is the beginning of the surveyor’s statement, cut to keep the page readable — the full 2567 continues past this point and often ends with the findings that matter most, such as whether an immediate jeopardy was removed before the surveyors left. The complete statement of deficiencies is a public record: request it from your state survey agency, or ask the home for its 2567 and plan of correction — it must make them available to residents and families.
- Long-Term Care Ombudsman — a free, confidential advocate for the resident. They act only with the resident’s consent and work to resolve the problem. Find yours at theconsumervoice.org/get_help.
- Adult Protective Services — the state agency that investigates suspected abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a vulnerable adult. Not sure of your state’s APS number? The federal Eldercare Locator will route you: 1-800-677-1116 or eldercare.acl.gov.
- State survey agency — the regulator that licenses and inspects the home. Every state has an official nursing-home complaint line and most take complaints online; the Ombudsman or Eldercare Locator can connect you.
Fines & penalties
No federal fines in the current CMS record.
Part of a chain
This home belongs to PRUITTHEALTH — 95 facilities. Here is how its ratings compare with the chain’s average across all its homes: See the whole chain — ratings, flags, fines and finances →
| Rating | This home | Chain avg | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Overall | 4 of 5 | 2.9 | +1.1 vs chain |
| Health inspection | 4 of 5 | 2.8 | +1.2 vs chain |
| Staffing | 2 of 5 | 2.5 | -0.5 vs chain |
| Quality measures | 4 of 5 | 3.6 | +0.4 vs chain |
The other 94 homes this chain runs (chain average 2.9★, per CMS)
Showing 40 of 94; lowest-rated first.
A home rated well below its chain’s average can signal local problems; a chain with a low average across the board is a bigger pattern worth researching. CMS chain data under-reports private-equity and REIT ownership, so treat this as a floor, not the full picture.
Who owns this facility
| Owner / manager | Type | Role | Since |
|---|---|---|---|
| ROBERTS, ERICA | Individual | W-2 MANAGING EMPLOYEE | since 10/01/2023 |
| PRUITT, NEIL | Individual | CORPORATE DIRECTOR; CORPORATE OFFICER | since 10/01/2023 |
| PRUITT, NANCY | Individual | CORPORATE OFFICER | since 10/01/2023 |
CMS files one row per role, so the 4 rows in the source record cover these 3 parties — each is shown once here with every role it holds. Nothing is omitted. The source lists no ownership percentage for any of them — PECOS records a share only for equity interests, not for board or management roles.
Follow the money — this home’s finances
Where a nursing home’s revenue comes from and where it goes — including money paid to companies under the same ownership. Most consumer sites never show this; we reproduce it straight from the Medicare cost report.
About 76% of this home’s resident-days are paid by Medicaid, which reimburses well below the cost of care in most states. Heavily Medicaid-dependent homes run on thinner budgets — a context worth holding next to the staffing and inspection record, not a fault in itself. This home reported $139K paid to related parties (affiliated landlords or management companies) in its most recent cost report. A reported operating loss is common in this industry and is not by itself a sign of trouble — but paired with large related-party payments it can mean profit is being taken elsewhere in the ownership structure.
Source: CMS Healthcare Provider Cost Reporting Information System (HCRIS), Medicare cost report Form CMS-2540 · fiscal year 2023. Facilities self-file these reports; figures are unaudited and a year or two behind. A home with no Medicare cost report on file shows no figures here.
Cost & finances
Straight from this home’s Medicare cost report (CMS, FY2023). These are its operating economics — what it costs to run per resident-day and what it collects on average across Medicare, Medicaid, and private pay — not a private-pay quote. Your out-of-pocket cost depends on payer and room type, so ask the facility directly; a higher operating cost can reflect richer staffing or a sicker population. The cost-of-care planner shows regional benchmarks by care type.
What families pay in GA
This is a Medicare- and Medicaid-certified nursing home, so it can accept Medicaid for long-term care — like nearly all U.S. nursing homes. The private-pay figures below are what families without Medicaid pay; once a resident qualifies for Medicaid, out-of-pocket cost for covered nursing-home care is typically close to $0 (almost all of their income goes to the home as their share of the cost; they keep a small personal needs allowance — for clothing, haircuts, a phone — and Medicaid pays the rest). The amount of that allowance is set by each state. Confirm Medicaid-bed availability with the home, and see the Georgia Medicaid page.
Median private-pay cost, CareScout (Genworth) 2025 Cost of Care Survey — a regional midpoint, not any single community’s rate. Private rooms and higher care levels cost more; ask for a current quote. Project your own in the cost-of-care planner.
Every figure above is reproduced from the CMS Provider Data Catalog (a public record), from the CMS extract processed 2026-08-01 — CMS provider number 115336. CMS refreshes its data monthly, and the star rating rests on the last standard inspection — dated 2025-05-21, which can lag current conditions. Staffing hours are CMS PBJ CY2026Q1 (Jan–Mar 2026). Check this record against the government’s own page for it: this home on Medicare Care Compare ↗ — the authoritative source, and the place to confirm anything here before you act on it. How we present it →
Not a government site. Eldercare Lens is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or authorized by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), Medicare, or any government agency. The star ratings, citations, and inspection wording on this page are reproduced from the public CMS record; the plain-English summaries, tiers, and comparisons around them are ours. We do not speak for CMS, and CMS has not reviewed this page. For the official record, go to Medicare Care Compare. How we’re funded →
Are you this operator? If the record here is out of date, or misses what you have since fixed, tell us and we will look: hello@eldercarelens.com. We reproduce the public CMS record and cannot change what it says — corrections to the underlying data go through CMS and your state survey agency — but we will correct anything we have got wrong about it, and we will say so on the page.